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Abstract
We analyze the cyclical eﬀects of moving from risk-insensitive (Basel I) to risk-sensitive
(Basel II) capital requirements in the context of a dynamic equilibrium model of rela-
tionship lending in which banks are unable to access the equity markets every period.
Banks anticipate that shocks to their earnings as well as the cyclical position of the
economy can impair their capacity to lend in the future and, as a precaution, hold
capital buﬀers. We ﬁnd that the new regulation changes the behavior of these buﬀers
from countercyclical to procyclical. Yet, the higher buﬀers maintained in expansions
are insuﬃcient to prevent a signiﬁcant contraction in the supply of credit at the arrival
of a recession. We show that cyclical adjustments in the conﬁdence level behind Basel
II can reduce its procyclical eﬀects without compromising banks’ long-run solvency.
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A widespread concern about the new risk-sensitive bank capital regulation, known as Basel
II, is that it might amplify business cycle ﬂuctuations, forcing banks to restrict their lending
when the economy goes into recession. Even in the old regime of essentially ﬂat capital
requirements of the 1988 Basel Accord (Basel I), bank capital regulation has the potential
to be procyclical because bank proﬁts may turn negative during recessions, impairing banks’
lending capacity. Additionally, the capital requirements prescribed by the Internal Ratings
Based (IRB) approach of Basel II are an increasing function of banks’ estimates of the
probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD) of each loan, and these inputs are
likely to rise in downturns. So the concern about Basel II is that the increase in capital
requirements during downturns might lead to a severe contraction in the supply of credit.
Two key conditions are necessary for these contractionary eﬀects to occur. First, some
banks must ﬁnd it diﬃcult to respond to the higher capital requirements by issuing new
equity. Second, some of their borrowers must be unable to switch to other sources of ﬁnance.1
However, these conditions are not suﬃcient for the existence of signiﬁcant procyclical eﬀects,
since banks anticipate that shocks to their earnings as well as the cyclical position of the
economy can impair their capacity to lend in the future and, as a precaution, may hold
capital in excess of the regulatory requirements. The critical question is whether capital
buﬀers (that will endogenously respond to regulatory changes) will be suﬃcient to neutralize
the procyclicality added by the new requirements.
This paper analyzes the cyclical eﬀects of Basel II in the context of a tractable dynamic
equilibrium model of relationship banking in which the business cycle is modeled as a two-
state Markov switching process. At every date a continuum of entrepreneurs enters the
market. They demand funds for two consecutive periods, giving rise to an overlapping
generations structure. Consistent with the view that relationship banking makes banks
privately informed about their borrowers, we assume that (i) borrowers become dependent
1These conditions have been noted by Blum and Hellwig (1995) and parallel the conditions in Kashyap,
Stein, and Wilcox (1993) for the existence of a bank lending channel in the transmission of monetary policy.
1on the banks with which they ﬁrst start a lending relationship, and (ii) banks with ongoing
relationships have no access to the equity market. The ﬁrst assumption captures the lock-in
eﬀects caused by switching costs and the potential lemons problem faced by banks when a
borrower is switching from another bank.2 The second assumption captures the implications
of these informational asymmetries for the market for seasoned equity oﬀerings, which can
create prohibitive transaction and dilution costs for urgent recapitalizations. It is consistent
with the view of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004, paragraph 757): “It
may be costly for banks to raise additional capital, especially if this needs to be done quickly
or at a time when market conditions are unfavorable.” It can also be seen as a convenient
reduced-form for the observed delays in banks’ recapitalizations.3
The combination of relationship lending and the inability of banks with ongoing rela-
tionships to access the equity market establishes a natural connection between the capital
shortages of some banks at a given date and the credit rationing of some borrowers at that
date. Yet, each cohort of new borrowers is assumed to be funded by banks that renew their
lending relationships, have access to the equity market, and hence face no binding limits to
their lending capacity.
In order to isolate the potential cyclicality coming from the supply side of the loan market,
we abstract from demand-side cyclicality and aggregate feedback eﬀects that might mitigate
and exacerbate, respectively, the aggregate implications of the cyclicality in banks’ lending
capacity. The model, however, could serve as a building block of a more comprehensive
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which, say, part of the production comes
from entrepreneurial ﬁrms that require relationship bank ﬁnance.
We deﬁne equilibrium under the assumption of free entry into the banking sector, which
implies that the banks’ net present value at the dates in which they can issue equity must
be zero. We characterize the equilibrium loan rates and banks’ capital decisions in each
2See Boot (2000) for a survey of the relationship banking literature. Several papers explicitly analyze
the costs of switching lenders under asymmetric information (e.g., Sharpe, 1990) as well as the trade-oﬀs
behind the possible use of multiple lenders as a remedy to the resulting lock-in eﬀects (e.g., Detragiache et
al., 2000). We are implicitly assuming that these alternative arrangements are prohibitively costly.
3Barakova and Carey (2001) study the time to recovery of US banks that became undercapitalized in the
1984-1999 period, showing that they needed an average of 1.6 years to restore their capital positions.
2state of the economy, and derive a number of comparative statics results. Assuming that
equity ﬁnancing is more costly than deposit ﬁnancing, we show that capital requirements
increase equilibrium loan rates, but have an ambiguous eﬀect on capital holdings. On the
one hand, the higher prospects of ending up with insuﬃcient capital call for the holding of
larger buﬀers; on the other hand, higher capital requirements reduce the proﬁtability of future
lending, and thus the bank’s interest in preserving its future lending capacity. Our analytical
expressions suggest that the shape of the distributions of loan losses in diﬀerent states of
the economy matter for determining which eﬀect dominates. Since the impact of capital
requirements on the supply of second period loans is, therefore, analytically ambiguous, we
assess it numerically.
For the numerical analysis, we describe the distributions of loan losses according to the
single risk factor model of Vasicek (2002), which provides the foundation for the IRB capital
requirements of Basel II. Under this model, capital requirements have an exact value-at-
risk interpretation: required capital is such that it can absorb the potential losses of a loan
portfolio over a one-year horizon with a probability (or conﬁdence level) of 99.9%.4
We ﬁnd that when the value of the ongoing lending relationships is large enough and the
cost of equity capital is not very large, banks optimally choose to keep capital buﬀers. Under
realistic parameterizations, Basel II leads banks to hold buﬀers that range from about 2%
of assets in recessions to about 5% in expansions. The procyclicality of these buﬀers reﬂects
that banks are concerned about the upsurge in capital requirements that takes place when
the economy goes into a recession. We ﬁnd, however, that these equilibrium buﬀers are
insuﬃcient to neutralize the eﬀects of the arrival of a recession, which may cause a very
signiﬁcant reduction in the supply of credit.5 Under the ﬂat capital requirements of Basel
I, the same economies would exhibit slightly countercyclical buﬀers and essentially no credit
4As shown by Gordy (2003), the single risk factor model also has the feature that the contribution of a
given loan to value-at-risk is additive, that is, it depends on the loan’s own characteristics and not of those
of the portfolio in which it is included.
5Supervisors seem aware of this possibility. For instance, Greenspan (2002) claims that “The supervisory
leg of Basel II is being structured to supplement market pressures in urging banks to build capital considerably
o v e rm i n i m u ml e v e l si ne x p a n s i o n sa sab u ﬀer that can be drawn down in adversity and still maintain adequate
capital.”
3crunch eﬀects.6 For the purposes of comparison, we also compute the equilibrium in a
laissez-faire environment without capital regulation, ﬁnding that banks’ capital buﬀers (in
this world, pure “economic capital”) would be of around 5% and not very cyclical, and credit
rationing would be more cyclical (and on average higher) than under Basel I, but less cyclical
(and on average lower) than under Basel II.
Our results also show that the probabilities of bank failure under Basel II are likely to
be substantially lower than under Basel I and, as one would expect, much lower (about
100 folds!) than in the laissez-faire benchmark. This suggests that the business cycle side-
eﬀects of Basel II may have a payoﬀ in terms of the long-term solvency of the banking
system. It also suggests the possibility of ameliorating the procyclical impact of Basel II
by introducing some small adjustments in the IRB capital requirements. Speciﬁcally, we
consider the possibility of modifying the cyclical proﬁle of conﬁdence levels in a way that
keeps their long-term average at 99.9%, but lessens the target in those situations in which
credit rationing turns out to be the highest under the Basel II regime. We ﬁnd that these
adjustments may achieve signiﬁcant reductions in procyclicality without major costs in terms
of banks’ long-term solvency.
The papers closest to ours are Estrella (2004), Peura and Keppo (2006), and Zhu (2008).
Estrella (2004) considers the dynamic optimization problem of a bank when its dividend
policy and equity raising processes are subject to quadratic adjustment costs, loan losses
follow a second-order autoregressive process, and bank failure is costly. The paper focuses
on the comparison between the optimal capital decisions of the bank in the absence of
regulation and under a value-at-risk rule, concluding that they are very diﬀerent. Peura and
Keppo (2006) consider a bank with an asset portfolio of exogenous size in the context of
a continuous-time model where raising equity takes time. A supervisor checks at random
intervals of time whether the bank complies with a minimum capital requirement. The paper
ﬁnds that the bank may hold capital buﬀers in order to reduce the risk of being closed for
6Some papers, starting with Bernanke and Lown (1991), point out that the introduction of Basel I caused
a credit crunch in the US during the months preceding the cyclical peak of 1990. But no credit crunch
episode has been detected after banks adjusted their capital holdings to the higher requirements.
4holding insuﬃcient capital when audited. Finally, Zhu (2008) adapts the model of Cooley and
Quadrini (2001) to the analysis of banks with decreasing returns to scale, minimum capital
requirements, and linear equity-issuance costs. Assuming ex-ante heterogeneity in banks’
capital positions, the paper ﬁnds that for poorly-capitalized banks, risk-sensitive capital
requirements increase safety without causing a major increase in procyclicality, whereas for
well-capitalized banks, the converse is true. Relative to these three papers, we simplify the
details of the banks’ dynamic optimization problem and embed such problem in the context
of an equilibrium model of relationship banking with endogenous loan rates. Additionally,
we adopt the realistic loan default model of the IRB approach of Basel II and focus on the
implications for the dynamics of aggregate bank lending.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3
we analyze the capital decision of a representative bank. Section 4 deﬁnes the equilibrium
and provides the comparative statics of equilibrium loan rates and banks’ capital holdings.
In Section 5 we present the numerical results concerning the size and cyclical behavior
of capital holdings, capital buﬀers, credit rationing, and probabilities of bank failure in a
number of parameterizations of the model. In Section 6 we examine adjustments of the
Basel II framework that reduce its procyclical eﬀects. Section 7 discusses the robustness of
our results to changes in some of the key assumptions of the model. Section 8 concludes.
Appendix A contains the proofs of the analytical results, and Appendix B discusses the
choice of parameter values for the numerical analysis.
2T h e M o d e l
Consider a discrete time economy in which time is indexed by t =0 ,1,2,... The economy is
populated by three classes of risk-neutral agents: entrepreneurs, banks, and investors.
2.1 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs belong to overlapping generations formed by a continuum of measure one of ex-
ante identical and penniless individuals who remain active for up to two periods (three dates).
5Entrepreneurs have the opportunity to undertake investment projects with the following
characteristics. The ﬁrst period project of an entrepreneur born at date t requires a unit
investment at that date. At date t +1the project yields 1+a if it is successful, and 1 − λ
if it fails, with a>0 and 0 <λ<1. The second period project of an entrepreneur born at
date t requires μ units of investment at date t +1 . The return at date t +2of this project
is independent of the return of the initial project, and equals (1+a)μ if it is successful, and
(1 − λ)μ if it fails, so parameter μ measures the scale of the second period project.
All projects operating from date t to date t +1have an identical probability of failure
pt. The outcomes of contemporaneous projects exhibit positive but imperfect correlation,
so their aggregate failure rate xt is a continuous random variable with support [0,1] and
cumulative distribution function (cdf) Ft(xt) such that
pt = Et (xt)=
Z 1
0
xt dFt(xt).
For simplicity, we consider the case in which the history of the economy up to date t
only aﬀects Ft(xt) (and, thus, pt) through an observable state variable st that can take two
values, h and l, and follows a Markov chain with
qh =P r( st = h | st−1 = h) and ql =P r( st = h | st−1 = l).
Moreover, we assume that the cdfs corresponding to the two states, Fh(·) and Fl(·), are
ranked in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance, so that the probabilities of business
failure in each state satisfy
ph >p l.
Thus states h and l may be interpreted as recession (high business failure) and expansion
(low business failure) states, respectively.
2.2 Banks
Banks are competitive intermediaries specialized in channeling funds from investors to en-
trepreneurs. Following the literature on relationship banking, we assume that the ﬁnancing
of an entrepreneur in this economy relies on a sequence of one-period loans granted by the
6single bank from which the entrepreneur obtains his ﬁrst loan. We also assume that setting
up the relationship with the entrepreneur makes the bank incur some cost c, to be subtracted
from ﬁrst period revenue.7 Finally, for simplicity, we abstract from the possibility that part
of the required second period investment μ is internally ﬁnanced by the entrepreneur.8
Banks are funded with deposits and equity capital, both of which are raised from in-
vestors. To simplify the analysis we assume that deposits are fully insured (at a zero pre-
mium), and their supply is perfectly elastic at a risk-free rate that we normalize to zero.9
We also assume that investors require an excess return δ ≥ 0 on each unit of equity capital.
T h ec o s to fc a p i t a lδ is intended to capture in a reduced-form manner distortions (such as
agency costs of equity or debt tax shields) that introduce a comparative disadvantage of
equity ﬁnancing relative to deposit ﬁnancing–in addition to deposit insurance.10
We introduce an important imperfection concerning banks’ equity ﬁnancing: While banks
entering the market or renewing their portfolio of lending relationships can raise new equity
in an unrestricted manner, recapitalization is impossible for banks with ongoing lending
relationships. This assumption is intended to capture in a simple way the long delays or
prohibitive dilution costs that a bank with opaque assets in place might face when organizing
an urgent equity injection.11
Banks are managed in the interest of their shareholders, who are protected by limited
7This cost might include personnel, equipment and other operating costs associated with the screening
and monitoring functions emphasized in the literature on relationship banking.
8This simpliﬁcation is standard in relationship-banking models; see, for example, Sharpe (1990, p. 1072)
or von Thadden (2004, p. 14). Moreover, if entrepreneurs’ ﬁrst-period proﬁts are small relative to the
required second-period investment (as in our numerical analysis below), the quantitative eﬀects of relaxing
this assumption would be negligible.
9In our numerical analysis the probability of bank failure is a small fraction of the 0.1% target of Basel
II, so the fair deposit insurance premium would be negligible.
10Further to the reasons for the extra cost of equity ﬁnancing oﬀered by the corporate ﬁnance literature,
Holmström and Tirole (1997) and Diamond and Rajan (2000) provide agency-based explanations speciﬁcally
related to banks’ monitoring role.
11These costs are most likely related to asymmetric information. Speciﬁc a l l y ,i naw o r l di nw h i c hb a n k s
learned about their borrowers after starting a lending relationship (like in Sharpe, 1990) and borrower
quality were asymmetrically distributed across banks, the market for seasoned equity oﬀerings might be
aﬀected by a lemons problem (like in Myers and Majluf, 1984). Thus, after a negative shock, banks with
lending relationships of poorer quality would be more interested in issuing equity at any given price, which
explains why the prices at which new equity could be raised may be unattractive to banks with higher-quality
relationships and why, in suﬃciently adverse circumstances, the market for those SEOs may collapse.
7liability. Entry to the banking sector is free at all dates, but banks are subject to a capital
requirement that obliges them to hold a capital-to-loans ratio of at least γs on the loans made
when the state of the economy is s. This formulation encompasses both Basel I and Basel
II type of regulation, as well as a laissez-faire environment with zero capital requirements.
In Basel I the capital requirement is (for corporate loans) a constant ratio γl = γh =8 % .
Basel II aims at a better alignment of capital requirements with the underlying banking
risks, and consequently requires higher capital for riskier loans. In our setup there is no
cross-sectional heterogeneity among borrowers but the state of the economy aﬀects the risk
of the representative loan, so Basel II amounts to a capital requirement in the high default
state, γh, higher than the capital requirement in the low default state, γl.12
To guarantee that the funding of investment projects is attractive to banks at all dates,
we assume that
(1 − ps)(1 + a)+ps(1 − λ) − c>(1 − γs)+γs(1 + δ), (1)
for s = h,l. Thus, in all states of the economy, the expected return per unit of investment,
net of the setup cost c, is greater than the cost of funding it with 1 − γs deposits and γs
capital.
3 Banks’ Capital Decision
Consistent with the assumption that banks with ongoing lending relationships may face
capital constraints, we assume that entrepreneurs born at date t obtain their ﬁrst period
loans from unrestricted banks that can raise capital at this date. This allows us to analyze
the banking industry as if it were made of overlapping generations of banks that operate for
two periods, specialize in loans to contemporaneous entrepreneurs, and cannot issue equity
12The precise Basel II formula that relates the capital requirement γs to the loans’ probability of default
ps will be described in Section 5.1. Although Basel II stipulates that estimates of the probability of default
“must be a long-run average of one-year default rates” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004,
paragraph 447), industry practices based on point-in-time rating systems, the dynamics of rating migrations,
and composition eﬀects make the eﬀective capital charges on a representative loan portfolio very likely to
be higher in recessions than in expansions. See, for example, Kashyap and Stein (2004), Catarineu-Rabell,
Jackson, and Tsomocos (2005), Gordy and Howells (2006), and Saurina and Trucharte (2007).
8at the interim date.13
In this economy, the supply of loans to the entrepreneurs who start up at date t might
be aﬀected by the recapitalization constraint faced by their banks at date t +1 .I n f a c t ,
banks will be aware of this and, in order to better accommodate the eﬀect of negative
shocks to their ﬁrst period income or possibly higher capital requirements in the case of
risk-sensitive capital regulation, they may hold a buﬀer of equity capital on top of the ﬁrst
period regulatory minimum.
To understand the ﬁnancing problem faced by each generation of entrepreneurs in this
economy, consider a representative bank that lends to the measure one continuum of entre-
preneurs starting up at date t, possibly reﬁnances them at date t+1, and gets liquidated at
date t+2.14 Let s and s0 denote the states of the economy at dates t and t+1, respectively.
At date t the representative bank raises 1 − ks deposits and ks ≥ γs capital, and invests
these funds in a unit portfolio of ﬁrst period loans. The equilibrium interest rate on these
initial loans, denoted rs, will be determined endogenously, as explained below, but under our
perfect competition assumption the bank takes it as given. Since the supply of deposits is
perfectly elastic at a zero interest rate, rs should be interpreted as the spread between initial
loan rates and deposit rates.
At date t +1the bank gets 1+rs from the fraction 1 − xt of performing loans (that is,
those extended to entrepreneurs whose projects are successful) and 1 − λ from the fraction
xt of defaulted loans, and incurs the setup cost c, so its assets are 1+rs − xt(λ + rs) − c,
while its deposit liabilities are 1 − ks. Thus its capital at date t +1is
k
0
s(xt)=ks + rs − xt(λ + rs) − c, (2)
where xt is a random variable whose cdf conditional on the state of the economy at date t
is Fs(xt). If k0
s(xt) < 0 the bank fails, while if k0
s(xt) ≥ 0 it can operate for a second period.
Using the deﬁnition of k0
s(xt), it is immediate to show that bank failure occurs when the
13Notice that a bank that can raise capital at date t is essentially identical to a new bank established at
that date.
14It will become obvious that banks that can issue equity face constant returns relative to the size of their
loan portfolio.
9default rate xt exceeds the critical value
b xs =
ks + rs − c
λ + rs
. (3)
The entrepreneurs that start up at date t demand an amount μ of second period loans
at date t +1 .15 At this stage entrepreneurs are dependent on the bank, so their demand is
inelastic as long as the loan interest rate does not exceed the success return of the projects
in the second investment period. Thus the second period loan rate will be a.
Since the bank cannot issue new equity at date t +1 , its maximum lending capacity is
given by the ratio between its available capital k0
s(xt) and the capital requirement γs0,w h i c h
depends on the state of the economy s0 at date t +1 . Thus, whenever k0
s(xt) ≥ 0 there are
two cases to consider: the case with excess lending capacity, k0
s(xt) ≥ γs0μ, and the case
with insuﬃcient lending capacity, k0
s(xt) <γ s0μ. Using the deﬁnition of k0
s(xt) in (2), it is
immediate to show that the latter case arises when the default rate xt exceeds the critical
value
e xss0 =
ks + rs − c − γs0μ
λ + rs
, (4)
which is obviously smaller than b xs, deﬁned in (3). Thus, whenever 0 < e xss0 < b xs < 1, one
can ﬁnd three diﬀe r e n ts i t u a t i o n sa td a t et +1 , depending on the realization of the default
rate: for xt ∈ [0,e xss0], the representative bank has excess lending capacity; for xt ∈ (e xss0,b xs],
the bank has insuﬃcient lending capacity; and for xt ∈ (b xs,1] the bank fails. We next derive
the expected continuation payoﬀs of the bank’s shareholders in each of the two cases where
t h eb a n kd o e sn o tf a i l .
When there is excess lending capacity at date t +1the bank ﬁnances μ loans using
(1 − γs0)μ deposits and γs0μ capital. Since k0
s(xt) ≥ γs0μ, the bank pays a dividend of
k0
s(xt) − γs0μ to its shareholders at date t +1 .16 At date t +2the bank gets 1+a from the
fraction 1−xt+1 of performing loans and 1−λ from the fraction xt+1 of defaulted loans, so its
15Note that this includes entrepreneurs that defaulted on their initial loans. This is because under our
assumptions such default does not reveal any information about the entrepreneurs’ second period projects.
16Since entrepreneurs born at date t +1borrow from banks that can raise equity at that date, the bank
may use the excess capital to either pay a dividend to its shareholders or to reduce the deposits to be raised
at this date. However, under deposit insurance and δ ≥ 0, the second alternative is strictly suboptimal.
10assets are [1+a−xt+1(λ+a)]μ, while its deposit liabilities are (1−γs0)μ. Thus shareholders’
expected payoﬀ, conditional on the state of the economy at date t +1 , can be expressed as
μπs0, where
πs0 =
Z 1
0
max{γs0 + a − xt+1(λ + a), 0} dFs0(xt+1) (5)
is the expected gross equity return on a per-unit-of-loans basis. The value of shareholders’
stake in the bank at date t +1 , inclusive of the dividend k0
s(xt) − γs0μ,c a nb ew r i t t e na s
vss0(xt)=( βπs0 − γs0)μ + k
0
s(xt), (6)
where β =1 /(1 + δ) is the shareholders’ discount factor implied by the cost of capital δ.
The ﬁrst term in (6) measures the net present value contribution of the capital that remains
invested in the bank up to date t +2 . Assumption (1) guarantees that βπs0 >γ s0, so that
such contribution is positive.17
When there is insuﬃcient lending capacity at date t+1the bank ﬁnances k0
s(xt)/γs0 loans
with [k0
s(xt)/γs0] − k0
s(xt) deposits and k0
s(xt) capital. At date t +2shareholders’ expected
payoﬀ, conditional on the state of the economy at date t+1, can be expressed as πs0k0
s(xt)/γs0,
where πs0 is the expected gross equity return on a per-unit-of-loans basis given by (5). When
there is insuﬃcient lending capacity at date t +1the bank pays no dividends at that date
and, hence, the value of shareholders’ stake in the bank is just
vss0(xt)=
βπs0
γs0
k
0
s(xt). (7)
As before, assumption (1) implies that βπs0 >γ s0, and hence shareholders strictly beneﬁt
from keeping k0
s(xt) invested in the bank.
Putting together the two cases, as well as the case in which the bank fails, we can express
the market value of the bank at date t +1 , inclusive of dividends, as
vss0(xt)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(βπs0 − γs0)μ + k0
s(xt), if xt ≤ e xss0,
βπs0
γs0
k0
s(xt), if e xss0 <x t ≤ b xs,
0, if xt > b xs,
(8)
17To see this, notice that πs0 >
R 1
0 [γs0 +a−xt+1(λ+a)] dFs0(xt+1)=γs0 +a−pt+1(λ+a), but assumption
(1) implies a − pt+1(λ + a) >δ γ s0 and hence πs0 > (1 + δ)γs0 = γs0/β.
11which is a continuous and piecewise linear function of xt.18 Going backward one period, the
net present value of the representative bank that in state s holds capital ks and charges an
interest rate rs on its unit of initial loans is
vs(ks,r s)=βEt[vss0(xt)] − ks, (9)
where the operator Et (·) takes care of the fact that, at date t, vs is subject to the uncertainty
about both the state of the economy at date t +1(which aﬀects the second period capital
requirement γs0 and gross equity return πs0)a n dt h ed e f a u l tr a t ext of initial loans (which
determines the capital k0
s(xt) available at that date).
Taking as given the initial loan rate rs, the representative bank that ﬁrst lends to a
generation of entrepreneurs in state s will choose its capital ks so as to maximize vs(ks,r s)
subject to the constraint ks ∈ [γs,1]. Since vs(ks,r s) is continuous in ks, for any given interest
rate rs, the bank’s capital decision always has a solution. In Appendix A we show that the
function vs(ks,r s) is neither concave nor convex in ks, and that we may have interior solutions
or corner solutions with ks = γs. When the solution is interior, there is a positive probability
that the bank has insuﬃcient lending capacity in the high default state s0 = h (and possibly
also in the low default state s0 = l), and there is a positive probability that the bank has
excess lending capacity in the low default state s0 = l (and possibly also in the high default
state s0 = h). The intuition for this result is as follows. If in the two possible states at date
t+1the bank had a zero probability of ﬁnding itself with insuﬃcient lending capacity, then
it would have an incentive to reduce its capital at date t in order to reduce its funding costs
at that date. On the other hand, if in the two possible states at date t +1the bank had a
zero probability of ﬁnding itself with excess lending capacity, then it would have an incentive
either to increase its capital at date t and thereby relax the capital constraint at date t+1,
or to go to the corner ks = γs.19
18Note that βπs0 >γ s0 implies that if the bank does not fail at date t +1the market value of its equity
vss0(xt) is strictly greater than the accounting value k0
s(xt).
19T h ep o s s i b l ep r e f e r e n c ef o rt h ec o r n e rks = γs is due to the fact that, in this case, the function vs(ks,r s)
is (locally) either decreasing or convex in ks; see Appendix A for the details.
124 Equilibrium
In the previous section we have characterized banks’ capital and lending decisions at the
dates in which they can raise capital, as well as at the dates in which they cannot. This
analysis has taken as given the interest rate rs at the beginning of a lending relationship
in state s, with the continuation loan rate being the success return a of the second period
investment projects. In order to deﬁne an equilibrium, it only remains to describe how the
initial loan rate is determined.
Given our free entry assumption, in equilibrium the pricing of these loans must be such
that the net present value of the bank is zero under the bank’s optimal capital decision.
Were it negative, no bank would extend loans. Were it positive, incumbent banks would
have an incentive to expand, and new banks would proﬁt from entering the market. Hence
in each state of the economy s = h,l we must have
vs(k
∗
s,r
∗
s)=0 , (10)
for
k
∗
s =a r g m a x
ks∈[γs,1]
vs(ks,r
∗
s). (11)
Therefore we may deﬁne an equilibrium as a sequence of pairs {(kt,r t)} describing the
capital-to-loan ratio kt of the banks that can issue equity at date t and the interest rate rt
charged on their initial loans, such that each pair (kt,r t) satisﬁes (10) and (11) for s = st,
where st is the state of the economy at date t.
The existence of an equilibrium is easy to establish. Diﬀerentiating (10) we have
dvs
drs
=
∂vs
∂k∗
s
dk∗
s
∂rs
+
∂vs
∂rs
,
where the ﬁrst term is zero, by the envelope theorem, and the second is positive, because
of the higher interest payments at date t +1(see Appendix A for details). So vs(k∗
s,r s) is
continuous and monotonically increasing in rs. Moreover, for suﬃciently low interest rates
we have vs(k∗
s,r s) < 0, while for rs = a assumption (1) implies vs(k∗
s,r s) > 0. Hence we
conclude that there is a unique r∗
s that satisﬁes vs(k∗
s,r ∗
s)=0 .20
20However, since the function vs(ks,r s) is neither concave nor convex in ks, there may be multiple optimal
134.1 Comparative statics
The structural parameters that describe the economy are the following: The success return
a (which determines the interest rate of continuation loans), the loss given default λ, the
scale of the second period projects μ, the cost of setting up a lending relationship c, the cost
of bank equity capital δ, the probabilities of transition from each state to the high default
state qh and ql, and the capital requirements γh and γl. To complete the description of
the economy, one must also specify the state-contingent cdfs of the default rate, Fh(xt) and
Fl(xt).
Table 1 summarizes the comparative statics of the equilibrium interest rates on initial
loans r∗
s, which are derived in Appendix A. The table shows the sign of the derivative dr∗
s/dz
obtained by diﬀerentiating (10) with respect to each exogenous parameter z.T h e e ﬀects
of the various parameters on r∗
s are inversely related to their impact on the proﬁtability of
banks’ lending activity. Other things equal, a and μ impact positively on the proﬁtability of
continuation lending; λ aﬀects negatively the proﬁtability of both initial lending (directly)
and continuation lending (directly and by reducing the availability of capital in the second
period); c has a similar negative eﬀect (with no direct eﬀect on the proﬁtability of continu-
ation loans); δ increases the cost of equity funding in both periods; γh and γl increase the
burden of capital regulation in the corresponding initial state, as well as in the corresponding
continuation state (which will be h or l with probabilities qs and 1−qs, respectively); ﬁnally,
qs decreases the proﬁtability of continuation lending because, in the high default state h,
loan losses are higher and the corresponding capital requirement γh may also be higher.
Table 1. Comparative statics of the initial loan rate r∗
s
z = aλμcδq s γh γl
dr∗
s
dz
− + − ++ + + +
values of ks corresponding to r∗
s.
14Table 2 summarizes the comparative statics of the equilibrium initial capital k∗
s chosen
by the representative bank in an interior solution–obviously, when the solution is at the
corner k∗
s = γs, marginal changes in parameters other than the capital requirement γs do
not change k∗
s. As further explained in Appendix A, the recursive nature of the comparative
statics of the system given by (10) and (11) makes it convenient to decompose the eﬀects
of the change in any parameter z into a direct eﬀect (for constant r∗
s)a n daloan rate eﬀect
(due to the change in r∗
s):
dk∗
s
dz
=
∂k∗
s
∂z
+
∂k∗
s
∂rs
dr∗
s
dz
.
Loan rate eﬀects can be easily determined. Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order condition that
characterizes k∗
s in an interior solution gives
∂2vs
∂k2
s
∂k∗
s
∂rs
+
∂2vs
∂ks∂rs
=0 .
The coeﬃcient of ∂k∗
s/∂rs is negative, by the second-order condition that characterizes k∗
s
in an interior solution, and the second term is negative (see Appendix A). Hence ∂k∗
s/∂rs is
negative, which implies that the signs of loan rate eﬀects are the opposite to those in Table
1. Intuitively, the initial capital ks and the initial loan rate rs are substitutes in the role of
providing the bank with suﬃcient capital for its continuation lending (see the deﬁnition of
k0
s(x) in (2)). In an interior solution, the marginal value of ks is decreasing in ks, and thus
also in rs, so a larger rs reduces the bank’s incentive to hold excess capital.
15Table 2. Comparative statics of the initial capital k∗
s
(in an interior equilibrium)
z = aλμcδq s γh γl
∂k∗
s
∂z
(direct eﬀect) +? + + − ???
∂k∗
s
∂rs
dr∗
s
dz
(loan rate eﬀect) + − + −− − − −
dk∗
s
dz
(total eﬀect) +? +? − ???
For the parameters a, μ, and δ, t h ed i r e c ta n dt h el o a nr a t ee ﬀects point in the same
direction, so the total eﬀect can be analytically signed. In essence, higher proﬁtability
of continuation lending (captured by a and μ) and lower costs of capital (captured by δ)
encourage banks to hold larger capital buﬀers in order to better self-insure against the default
shocks that threaten its continuation lending. For the setup cost c, the direct and the loan
rate eﬀects have unambiguous but opposite signs, so the total eﬀect is ambiguous. The
positive direct eﬀect comes from the fact that, by the deﬁnition of k0
s(x) in (2), c subtracts
to the bank’s continuation lending capacity exactly like ks adds to it, without aﬀecting the
proﬁtability of such lending and hence the marginal gains from self-insuring against default
shocks. The direct eﬀects on ks of the parameters λ, qs, γh, and γl have ambiguous signs.
Increasing any of these parameters simultaneously reduces the proﬁtability of continuation
lending and impairs the expected capital position of the bank when such lending has to
be made. The value of holding excess capital in the initial lending period falls, but the
prospects of ending up with insuﬃcient capital increase. So the proﬁtability of continuation
lending and the need for self-insurance against default shocks move in opposite directions.
The resulting ambiguity of the direct eﬀects extends to the total eﬀects.
16The details of the analytical expressions suggest that the shape of the distributions of
default rates matter for the determination of these eﬀects, which eventually becomes a ques-
tion to be elucidated either empirically or by numerically solving the model under realistic
parameterizations. Since the goal of the paper is to assess the potential impact of the Basel
II capital requirements, which are in the process of being implemented, we resort to the
second alternative.
5N u m e r i c a l R e s u l t s
To further explore the forces that aﬀect banks’ initial capital buﬀers as well as to assess the
implications for the dynamics of lending under diﬀerent regulations, we numerically solve the
model in a number of plausible scenarios. Importantly, in all scenarios we assume that the
state-contingent probability distributions of the default rate, described by the cdfs Fh(xt)
and Fl(xt), conform to the single risk factor model that underlies the capital requirements
associated with the IRB approach of Basel II.21 This means that we assess the implications
of the new capital requirements under the assumption that the supervisor’s model of refer-
ence is correct.22 In line with the one-year ahead value-at-risk perspective of Basel II, the
parameterization assumes that each model period corresponds to one calendar year.
5.1 The single risk factor model
Suppose that the project undertaken by entrepreneur i at date t fails if yit < 0, where yit is
a latent random variable deﬁned by
yit = αt +
√
ρt ut +
p
1 − ρt εit,
where αt is a parameter determined by the state of the economy at date t, ut is a single factor
of systematic risk, εit is an idiosyncratic risk factor, and ρt ∈ (0,1) is a state-contingent
21The single factor model is due to Vasicek (2002) and its use as a foundation for the capital requirements
of Basel II is due to Gordy (2003).
22Of course, the model could be similarly solved under alternative speciﬁcations of the relevant cdfs, but
in that case the requirements set under the regulatory formula described below would not have the direct
value-at-risk interpretation implied by our parameterization.
17parameter that determines the correlation among project failures. It is assumed that ut and
εit are N(0,1) random variables, independently distributed from each other and over time,
as well as, in the case of εit, across projects. Let Φ(·) denote the cdf of a standard normal
random variable. Conditional on the information available at date t, the probability of failure
of project i is pt =P r( yit < 0) = Φ(−αt), since yit ∼ N(αt,1), which implies αt = −Φ−1(pt).
With a continuum of projects, the aggregate failure rate xt is only a function of the
realization of the single risk factor ut. Speciﬁcally, by the law of large numbers, xt coincides
with the probability of failure of a (representative) project i conditional on the information
available at t and the realization of ut:
xt = gt(ut)=P r
³
−Φ
−1(pt)+
√
ρt ut +
p
1 − ρt εit < 0 | ut
´
= Φ
µ
Φ−1(pt) − √ρt ut √
1 − ρt
¶
.
Using the fact that ut ∼ N(0,1), the cumulative distribution function of the aggregate failure
rate can be expressed as
Ft(xt)=P r( gt(ut) ≤ xt)=P r
¡
ut ≤ g
−1
t (xt)
¢
= Φ
µ√
1 − ρt Φ−1(xt) − Φ−1(pt)
√ρt
¶
.
In Basel II the correlation parameter ρt is assumed to be a decreasing function of the
state-contingent probability of default pt. Hence we postulate the following state-contingent
probability distributions of the default rate
Fs(x)=Φ
µ√
1 − ρs Φ−1(x) − Φ−1(ps)
√ρs
¶
, (12)
where, as stipulated by Basel II for corporate loans, the correlation parameter ρs is decreasing
in the probability of default ps according to the formula
ρs =0 .12
µ
2 −
1 − e−50ps
1 − e−50
¶
. (13)
In the IRB approach of Basel II, capital must cover the one-year ahead losses due to loan
defaults with a probability of 99.9%. Hence the capital requirement in state s is given by
γs = λF−1
s (0.999), where F−1
s (0.999) is the 99.9% quantile of the distribution of the default
rate. Using (12), the Basel II capital requirement becomes
γs = λΦ
µ
Φ−1(ps)+√ρs Φ−1(0.999)
√
1 − ρs
¶
, (14)
18where ρs is given by (13). This is the formula for corporate exposures of a one-year maturity
that appears in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004, paragraph 272).23 It should
be noted that Basel II establishes that the expected losses, λps, should be covered with
general loan-loss provisions, while the remaining charge, λ(γs − ps), should be covered with
capital. However, from the perspective of our analysis, provisions are just another form of
equity capital, so the distinction between the expected and unexpected components of loan
losses is immaterial.
5.2 Benchmark scenarios
Table 3 shows the set of parameter values that deﬁne the three benchmark scenarios consid-
ered in our numerical analysis. The scenarios diﬀer in the volatility of the state-contingent
probabilities of default pl and ph. We brieﬂy comment on them here, relegating further dis-
cussion in the light of available data on the US banking sector to Appendix B. Note that
because of our normalization of the risk-free rate to zero, all interest rates and rates of return
in the parameterization should be interpreted as spreads over the risk-free rate.
Panel A of Table 3 contains the parameters that are common to the three scenarios. The
value of the success return a =0 .04 implies that the interest rate of continuation loans is
4%.24 The loss given default (LGD) parameter λ =0 .45 is taken from the Basel II “foun-
dation IRB” formula for unsecured corporate exposures.25 The scale of the second period
projects μ =1provides a neutral starting point–ﬁne-tuning this parameter would require
some empirical estimation of the growth rate of loan exposures along a typical corporate
lending relationship or, alternatively, of the asset growth rate in a representative business
ﬁnanced by banks. The cost of setting up a lending relationship c =0 .03 is chosen so as
yield realistic initial loan rates. The cost of bank capital δ =0 .04 is intended to capture
the tax disadvantages of equity ﬁnancing relative to deposit ﬁnancing. The probabilities of
23The Basel II formula incorporates an adjustment factor that is increasing in the maturity of the exposure,
and equals one for a maturity of one year.
24The success return could be higher, as long as the part that can be pledged to the bank without destroying
the entrepreneur’s incentives is set at 4%. See Holmström and Tirole (1997) for a discussion of the concept
of pledgeable return.
25In the “advanced IRB” approach banks are allowed to use their own internal models to estimate λ.
19transition to the high default state, ql =0 .20 and qh =0 .64, imply expected durations of 5
years for the low default state and 2.8 years for the high default state, which we calibrate
according to the observed behavior of the charge-oﬀ ratio of FDIC-insured commercial banks
in the US during the period 1970-2004.26
Table 3. Parameter values in the benchmark scenarios
A. Common parameters
aμλcδq h ql
0.04 1.00 0.45 0.03 0.04 0.64 0.20
B. Probability of default (PD) scenarios
Benchmark PDs Basel II requirements
Scenarios ps (%) γs (%)
Low s = l 1.20 6.87
volatility s = h 2.91 10.01
Medium s = l 1.10 6.60
volatility s = h 3.26 10.51
High s = l 1.00 6.31
volatility s = h 3.62 11.00
The three PD scenarios are deﬁned so as to keep the expected capital charge under
Basel II equal to 8%, which is the capital requirement under Basel I. Appendix B
discusses the choice of parameter values in the light of available data on US banks.
Panel B of Table 3 shows our choices for the probabilities of default (PDs) in each state,
pl and ph, and the corresponding Basel II capital requirements, γl and γh, implied by (14).
In each scenario we have chosen the PDs such that the long-run average capital requirement
26Expected durations are computed as ql +2 ( 1− ql)ql +3 ( 1− ql)2ql + ... =1 /ql =5for state l, and
(1 − qh)+2 qh(1 − qh)+3 q2
h(1 − qh)+... =1 /(1 − qh) ' 2.8 for state h. It should be noted that, in line
with the empirical ﬁndings of Bruche and González-Aguado (2006), in our parameterization credit cycle
downturns last longer than typical business cycle downturns.
20under Basel II (given the underlying unconditional probabilities of visiting each state) is 8%,
as under the risk-insensitive Basel I regulation.27 The idea is to allow for a comparison of the
cyclical eﬀects of Basel I and Basel II that is not aﬀected by a change in the long-run average
level of the capital requirements. The three scenarios only diﬀer in the magnitude of the
cross-state variation in the PDs–and all of them are within a range that can be considered
empirically plausible.
I ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a tw ea r ea s s u m i n gt h a tt h eL G Dp a r a m e t e rλ does no depend on
the state s. Altman et al. (2005), using data on bond defaults, ﬁnd that LGDs are positively
correlated with default rates. In the context of our model, however, cyclical variation in
LGDs has a similar eﬀect on banks’ proﬁts and Basel II capital requirements as an increase
in the cyclical variation in PDs. Hence, the eﬀects of our conservative assumption could be
oﬀset by placing more weight on the results corresponding to the scenarios with more volatile
PDs.
5.3 Capital buﬀers and procyclicality
T a b l e4s h o w si n i t i a ll o a nr a t e sr∗
s, initial capital k∗
s, and the implied capital buﬀers ∆∗
s =
k∗
s−γs, for s = h,l, in each of the scenarios described in Table 3 and under the two regulatory
frameworks that we want to compare: Basel I, with a ﬂat capital requirements of 8%,a n d
Basel II, with the requirements given by (14). As a reference, we also include the results in
a laissez-faire environment without capital requirements (γh = γl =0 ).
The results show that initial loan rates are always higher in the high default state,
reﬂecting the need to compensate banks for both a higher PD and a lower prospective
proﬁtability of continuation lending (since the high default state h is more likely to occur
after state h than after state l). These rates are very similar in the two Basel frameworks,
conﬁrming previous results from static models predicting that the loan pricing implications
of Basel II will be small.28 Basel II slightly increases loan rates in the high default state, and
27The unconditional probabilities of the low and the high default state, denoted φl and φh, can be obtained
by solving the system of equations qlφl+qhφh = φh and φl+ φh =1 , which gives φl =( 1−qh)/(1−qh+ql) '
0.64 and φh = ql/(1 − qh + ql) ' 0.36.
28See Repullo and Suarez (2004).
21induces no signiﬁcant change in loan rates in the low default state. These eﬀects may be
explained by the fact that Basel II signiﬁcantly increases banks’ capital in the high default
state, but has a smaller impact on capital in the low default state.
Table 4. Initial loan rates, capital, and capital buﬀers
(all variables in %)
Basel I Basel II Laissez-faire
Scenarios r∗
s k∗
s ∆∗
s r∗
s k∗
s ∆∗
s r∗
s k∗
s ∆∗
s
Low s = l 1.2 11.0 3.0 1.2 11.9 5.0 0.7 5.2 5.2
volatility s = h 2.4 11.2 3.2 2.5 12.2 2.2 1.8 5.4 5.4
Medium s = l 1.2 11.0 3.0 1.2 11.7 5.1 0.6 5.1 5.1
volatility s = h 2.7 11.2 3.2 2.8 12.5 1.9 2.1 5.3 5.3
High s = l 1.1 10.9 2.9 1.1 10.7 4.3 0.5 5.0 5.0
volatility s = h 3.0 11.1 3.1 3.1 12.6 1.6 2.3 5.2 5.2
The parameters that deﬁne each of the three scenarios and the associated Basel II capital
requirements are described in Table 3. The Basel I capital requirement is always 8%.
The results also show that, in order to preserve their future lending capacity, banks hold
sizeable capital buﬀers. Under Basel I, the cyclical variation in PDs has a rather small impact
on capital decisions, although excess capital tends to be larger in the high default state (where
loan losses can be expected to cause a larger reduction in future lending capacity) than in
the low default state.29 Under Basel II the cross-state variability in PDs visibly translates
into greater variability of both total capital and capital buﬀers. Interestingly, the cyclical
pattern of the buﬀers gets reversed, from slightly countercyclical in Basel II to strongly
procyclical in Basel II. The main reason for this reversal is that, under Basel II, banks in the
low default state l anticipate that if the economy switches to the high default state h the
capital requirement will increase from γl to γh. This jump in capital requirements implies
29This is consistent with the existing evidence about the behavior of capital buﬀers under Basel I–
including Ayuso et al. (2004) with Spanish data, Lindquist (2004) with Norwegian data, and Bikker and
Metzemakers (2004) with data from 29 OECD countries–and raises doubts about the interpretation that
such evidence reﬂects banks’ myopia.
22a reduction in their lending capacity so, to preserve continuation lending, they have an
incentive to hold larger precautionary capital buﬀers than under Basel I, where the capital
requirement stays at 8%. Symmetrically, under Basel II, banks in the high default state h
anticipate that if the economy switches to the low default state l the capital requirement
will decrease from γh to γl, so they have an incentive to hold smaller capital buﬀers than
under Basel I. The numerical results for the three scenarios show that the ﬁrst eﬀect (higher
buﬀers in state l)t u r n so u tt ob em o r ei m p o r t a n tt h a nt h es e c o n de ﬀect (lower buﬀers in
state h), which implies that the move from Basel I to Basel II will increase the long-run
average level of the capital buﬀers (computed with the unconditional probabilities of visiting
each state).30
As for the laissez-faire environment, the results in Table 4 conﬁrm that, under our pa-
rameterization, the “economic capital” chosen by banks starting lending relationships is
well-below the regulatory capital of any of the two Basel frameworks, but signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero (and very similar across states), which reﬂects banks’ interest in preserving
their valuable lending during the second period.31 The lower initial interest rates in both
states (relative to the Basel frameworks) reﬂect the savings on the costs of equity ﬁnancing
due to the use of less capital in the two lending periods.
Table 5 compares the cyclical behavior of credit rationing under Basel I and Basel II,
as well as in the laissez-faire environment. Lending in any given period is made up of
initial loans, whose quantity is always one, and continuation loans, whose quantity varies
w i t ht h el e n d i n gc a p a c i t yo ft h eb a n k st h a ta r eu n a b l et oi s s u ee q u i t yi nt h a tp e r i o d . W e
denote by credit rationing the expected percentage of continuation projects that cannot be
undertaken because of banks’ insuﬃcient lending capacity. Table 5 shows credit rationing
in state s0 = l,h when it is reached from state s = l,h according to any of the four possible
sequences (s,s0). In our simple model, investment and hence expected gross output (the
returns from the funded investment projects) are linearly related to total credit, given the
30The increase in the medium volatility scenario is of 0.88 percentage points.
31Elizalde and Repullo (2007) discuss the concept of economic capital (and its relationship with the
regulatory capital of Basel II) in a model where banks are concerned about the loss of charter values when
they become insolvent.
23state of the economy, so we can use credit rationing as a summary statistic of aggregate
economic activity.
Table 5. Credit rationing
(all variables in %)
Credit rationing in state s0
Scenarios Basel I Basel II Laissez-faire
Low volatility
(s,s0)=( l,l) 1.4 0.3 2.2
(s,s0)=( l,h) 1.4 4.9 2.2
(s,s0)=( h,h) 2.5 3.8 4.5
(s,s0)=( h,l) 2.5 0.7 4.5
Unconditional 1.8 1.7 3.0
Medium volatility
(s,s0)=( l,l) 1.4 0.3 2.1
(s,s0)=( l,h) 1.4 10.7 2.1
(s,s0)=( h,h) 2.7 4.5 5.2
(s,s0)=( h,l) 2.7 0.6 5.2
Unconditional 1.9 2.6 3.2
High volatility
(s,s0)=( l,l) 1.3 0.4 2.0
(s,s0)=( l,h) 1.3 24.4 2.0
(s,s0)=( h,h) 3.0 5.3 6.1
(s,s0)=( h,l) 3.0 0.5 6.1
Unconditional 1.9 4.6 3.5
The parameters that deﬁne each of the scenarios and the associated Basel II capital
requirements are described in Table 3. The Basel I capital requirement is 8%. Credit
rationing is the expected percentage of continuation projects that cannot be undertaken
because of banks’ insuﬃcient lending capacity. The rows show credit rationing in state
s’ when it is reached from state s according to the sequence (s,s’) in the ﬁrst column.
Rows labeled ‘unconditional’ show weighted averages based on the unconditional
probabilities of each state.
I nB a s e lI( a sw e l la si nt h el a i s s e z - f a i r ee n v i r o n m e n t )c r e d i tr a t i o n i n gd o e sn o td e p e n do n
whether the arrival state s0 is a high or a low default state, since the capital requirement is
constant (at 8% or 0%, respectively). Rationing only depends on the proﬁts realized during
24the previous period, which determine the capital available for continuation lending. The
distribution of this random variable depends on the state s of the economy in the previous
period. This explains why the ﬁgures for Basel I (and the laissez-faire environment) in Table
5o n l yv a r yw i t hs in each scenario, and are smaller for s = l than for s = h.
Under Basel II, the impact of bank proﬁts is also present, but the overall eﬀects on
credit rationing are dominated by the cross-state variation of the capital requirements, and
its endogenous eﬀects on capital buﬀers. Thus the sequences with (s,s0)=( l,h), and then
those with (s,s0)=( h,h), systematically exhibit the largest credit rationing. Intuitively, in
t h el o wd e f a u l ts t a t el the transition to the high default state h is less likely than continuing
in h after being in h; additionally, in state l the required capital is lower than in state h.F o r
both reasons, banks hold less capital in s = l than in s = h ( s e eT a b l e4 ) .B u tt h e ni ft h e
economy ends up in s0 = h, the combination of a lower capitalization in the previous period
and a higher current requirement explains the very sizable contractions in lending capacity
s h o w ni nT a b l e5 . 32 In particular, for the medium volatility scenario, when the economy
goes from the low to the high default state (and despite of the fact that banks hold a capital
buﬀer of 5.1% in the low default state) an average of 10.7% of the continuation projects are
rationed, a ﬁgure that goes up to 24.4% in the high volatility scenario.
Thus Basel II implies signiﬁcantly larger cyclical variation in credit rationing (and con-
sequently in investment and output) than Basel I. Its incidence on the average level of credit
rationing, shown in the rows labeled ‘unconditional’ in Table 5, depends on the volatility of
PDs along the cycle. For the medium volatility scenario, the extra cost of Basel II in terms
of long-run average credit rationing amounts to about 0.7% of the potential continuation
investment.
The behavior of credit rationing in the laissez-faire environment is very much an ampliﬁed
version of what is observed under Basel I, with levels of rationing that are between 50% and
100% larger. In relation with Basel II, however, the comparison depends on the volatility
32Interestingly, for the sequences with s0 = l (which entail the lowest credit rationing under Basel II), the
eﬀect of bank proﬁts becomes visible again, producing lower rationing in the (l,l) sequence than in the (h,l)
sequence.
25of PDs along the cycle: except in the low volatility scenario, the laissez-faire exhibits lower
cyclicality and, in the high volatility scenario, it even exhibits lower unconditional expected
credit rationing.
5.4 Banks’ solvency
We next compare the various regulatory regimes in terms of banks’ solvency. Table 6 reports
the probability of failure of the representative bank for each of the scenarios described in
Table 3 and each of the possible states of the economy. These probabilities are diﬀerent
for banks making initial loans (that in state s start with capital ks, earn interest rs on
performing loans, and pay the cost c of starting up their lending relationships) and banks
making continuation loans (that in state s start with capital γs, earn interest a on performing
loans, and do not pay c). Unlike in the results on credit rationing, these probabilities are
purely forward-looking (i.e., they do not depend on the state of the economy in the previous
period) and hence we only report their conditional-on-s and unconditional values.
Table 6 shows that the probabilities of bank failure are much more uniform across states
under the risk-sensitive capital requirements of Basel II than under the constant 8% capital
requirement of Basel I. Conditional on the state of the economy, the link between the level of
the requirements and the level of solvency of second period banks is direct (since these banks
hold no capital buﬀers and the net interest income earned on performing loans is the same
in both states), so not surprisingly Basel II implies a signiﬁcant improvement in solvency
in the high default state h and a reduction in solvency in the low default state l, with the
unconditional eﬀect being clearly positive. For ﬁrst period banks there are additional eﬀects
coming from the endogenous capital buﬀers and loan interest rates. Our results in Table
4 show that the latter eﬀects are very small, so solvency is inversely related to the total
holdings of capital. Hence Basel II increases the solvency of ﬁrst period banks in state h,
and (in the low and medium volatility scenario) it also increases their solvency in state l,
despite imposing lower requirements than the 8% of Basel I. The unconditional eﬀect of Basel
II on the solvency of ﬁrst period banks is positive in the three scenarios. All in all, Basel II
roughly halves the probabilities of bank failure associated with Basel I, and makes the risk
26of failure more evenly distributed over time. This suggests that the risk-sensitive capital
requirements of Basel II have a payoﬀ in terms of the long-term solvency of the banking
system.
Table 6. Banks’ solvency
(all variables in %)
Probability of bank failure
Scenarios Basel I Basel II Laissez-faire
Low volatility
1st-period banks: s = l 0.025 0.016 2.185
s = h 0.094 0.051 4.492
Unconditional 0.050 0.028 3.013
2nd-period banks: s = l 0.008 0.014 1.023
s = h 0.054 0.018 5.721
Unconditional 0.024 0.015 2.710
Medium volatility
1st-period banks: s = l 0.022 0.014 2.080
s = h 0.115 0.054 5.210
Unconditional 0.056 0.029 3.203
2nd-period banks: s = l 0.006 0.014 0.867
s = h 0.074 0.019 7.195
Unconditional 0.030 0.015 3.139
High volatility
1st-period banks: s = l 0.019 0.023 1.968
s = h 0.140 0.059 6.126
Unconditional 0.063 0.036 3.461
2nd-period banks: s = l 0.005 0.013 0.723
s = h 0.099 0.019 8.895
Unconditional 0.039 0.015 3.657
The parameters that deﬁne each of the scenarios and the associated Basel II capital
requirements are described in Table 3. The Basel I capital requirement is 8%. Rows
labeled ‘unconditional’ show weighted averages based on the unconditional probabilities
of each state.
It is worth noting that the probabilities of bank failure are very small under both
regulations–unconditionally, they range between 0.024% and 0.063% under Basel I, and
27between 0.015% and 0.036% under Basel II. Interestingly, the combination of capital buﬀers
and net interest income earned on performing loans makes the latter much lower than the
0.1% implied by the 99.9% conﬁdence level of Basel II. This combination also explains the
fact that the probabilities of bank failure under the laissez-faire environment are not very
high–unconditionally, they range between 2.710% and 3.657%.
6 Policy analysis
Our previous results show that the move from Basel I to Basel II is very likely to imply an
increase in the cyclicality of the supply of bank credit. Speciﬁcally, we predict a particularly
strong reduction in banks’ lending capacity (and a rise in credit rationing) when the economy
goes into a recession. The results also suggest that banks’ solvency will be enhanced by the
introduction of Basel II.
Consequently, the comparison of Basel I and Basel II in welfare terms is not trivial and
will crucially depend on the (structural or reduced-form) imputation of a social cost to bank
failures.33 Although the model could be extended to perform such a welfare analysis, the
discussion in this section will be based on the (simpler) argument that it is possible to
ameliorate the procyclical impact of Basel II by introducing some small adjustments in the
conﬁdence levels set by the regulator. In particular, we consider the possibility of modifying
the cyclical proﬁle of conﬁdence levels in such a way that keeps their long-term average
at 99.9%–the current level–but lessens the target in those states (or sequences of states)
where credit rationing turns out to be the highest under Basel II regulation.
Table 7 shows the results of two speciﬁc policy experiments of this kind. Both are
performed under the parameterization of the medium volatility scenario described in Table
3. Policy 1 reduces the conﬁdence level in the high default state h to 99.8% and increases
the conﬁdence level in the low default state l to η>99.9% so as to maintain the long-run
33Repullo and Suarez (2004) perform this type of welfare analysis in a static setup where procyclicality is
not a concern, but capital requirements imply a deadweigh loss due to the extra cost of equity ﬁnancing.
28average at 99.9%. Thus η solves:
η × φl +0 .998 × φh =0 .999,
where φl and φh are, respectively, the unconditional probabilities of the low and the high
default state.34 Such a small adjustment causes a relevant change in capital requirements
( f r o m6 . 6 %t o7 . 9 %f o rγl and from 10.5% to 9.3% for γh), modifying banks’ optimal buﬀers
(which become less procyclical), and smoothing the cyclicality of credit rationing. As shown
in Panel A of Table 7, credit rationing in the sequences (l,h) and (h,h) falls from 10.7% and
4.5%, respectively, to less than 4% in both sequences. Unconditionally, it falls from 2.6% to
1.9%, which is its unconditional value under Basel I. Interestingly, although the probabilities
of bank failure in the high default state h obviously increase, they remain lower than 0.08%
in all cells, and their unconditional average only increases from 0.029% to 0.040% for ﬁrst
period banks, and from 0.015% to 0.017% for second period banks.
In Policy 2 we conﬁne the reduced 99.8% conﬁdence level to periods where state h occurs
after state l. The objective is to reduce the credit rationing detected in the second period
of sequences with (s,s0)=( l,h). The capital requirement when h occurs after h is left
unchanged, while the conﬁdence level applied to the second period of the sequences (l,l)
and (h,l) is increased so as to to keep the long-run average conﬁdence level at 99.9%. By
construction, Policy 2 makes smaller adjustments in the Basel II capital requirements, so it
will be less eﬀective than Policy 1 in terms of smoothing credit rationing, but it will also be
less signiﬁcant in terms of its implications for banks’ solvency. The results in Table 7 show
that credit rationing in the second period of the (l,h) sequence gets substantially reduced,
but not as much as with Policy 1, while the unconditional probabilities of bank failure are
almost unchanged relative to those of Basel II.
All in all, our policy experiments show the feasibility of achieving signiﬁcant gains in
terms of credit rationing without major costs in terms of banks’ long-term solvency. This
can be achieved with cyclical adjustments that preserve the value-at-risk foundation of the
Basel II requirements. The choice between Policy 1 and Policy 2 (or the ﬁne tuning of
34See Footnote 27 for the expressions of φl and φh in terms of the transition probabilities ql and qh.
29their details) should eventually depend on the trade-oﬀ b e t w e e nt h eg a i n si nt e r m so fa
smoother and lower credit rationing, and the losses in terms of less smooth and slightly
higher probabilities of bank failure.
Table 7. Procyclicality correction
(all variables in %)
A. Credit rationing
Credit rationing in state s0
(s,s0)= ( l,l)( l,h)( h,h)( h,l) Unconditional
Basel I 1.4 1.4 2.7 2.7 1.9
Basel II 0.3 10.7 4.5 0.6 2.6
Policy 1 0.8 3.7 3.6 1.6 1.9
Policy 2 0.5 4.4 4.4 0.6 1.9
B. Banks’ solvency
Probability of failure of 1st-period banks in state s0
(s,s0)= ( l,l)( l,h)( h,h)( h,l) Unconditional
Basel I 0.022 0.115 0.115 0.022 0.056
Basel II 0.014 0.054 0.054 0.014 0.029
Policy 1 0.017 0.079 0.079 0.017 0.040
Policy 2 0.019 0.054 0.054 0.019 0.031
Probability of failure of 2nd-period banks in state s0
(s,s0)= ( l,l)( l,h)( h,h)( h,l) Unconditional
Basel I 0.006 0.074 0.074 0.006 0.030
Basel II 0.014 0.019 0.019 0.014 0.015
Policy 1 0.007 0.035 0.035 0.007 0.017
Policy 2 0.011 0.035 0.019 0.014 0.016
The parameters and associated Basel II capital requirements are those of the medium volatility scenario
described in Table 3. The Basel I capital requirement is 8%. Policy 1 reduces the conﬁdence level
of the Basel II formula to 99.8% in state h and increases it in state l so as to keep the unconditional
average at 99.9%. Policy 2 sets the conﬁdence level at 99.8% only when state h occurs after state l,
compensating it when state l occurs so as to keep the unconditional average at 99.9%. Columns
labeled ‘unconditional’ show weighted averages based on the unconditional probabilities of each state.
307D i s c u s s i o n
In this section we discuss some simplifying features of our model, including the distribution
of banks’ market power in the ﬁrst and second period of the lending relationships, the use of
short-term loan contracts, and the assumption that banks with ongoing relationships have no
access to the equity market. We consider the possible eﬀects of relaxing these assumptions,
noting that in some cases our conclusions about the procyclicality of Basel II would be
strengthened.
7.1 Competition and market power
In our model banks are perfectly competitive in the market for ﬁr s tp e r i o dl o a n sa n da c t
as monopolists in the market for second period loans. This is justiﬁed by the fact that
borrowers get locked-in after one period due to some (unmodeled) asymmetric information
problem (e.g., one that makes borrowers searching for a new bank after one period look like
“rejected” by the initial bank, which leads to a standard lemons problem in the reﬁnancing
market). We have opted for an all-or-nothing modeling of the lock-in eﬀect for several
reasons. The most obvious one is tractability: if the market for continuation loans were
more competitive, the degree of eﬀective competition and the resulting loan rates would
vary with the degree of credit rationing. Even in the polar case of perfect competition in
the market for second period loans, over the range of poor realizations of the risk factor that
lead to rationing, banks would be able to appropriate scarcity rents from their (non-rationed)
borrowers.35 Relative to the current modeling, the more competitive market for second period
loans would entail lower continuation rents for banks, and hence lower incentives for them
to keep capital buﬀers. This uncovers a second justiﬁcation for our assumption: it yields a
conservative estimate of the procyclicality induced by capital regulation.
35In the context of the single risk factor model of Basel II, either all banks or no bank are capital constrained
in the market for second period loans, so the second period loan rate would be either the monopoly rate a
or some break-even rate that makes continuation lending a zero net present value investment for the banks.
317.2 Short-term loan contracts
We have described the relationship between entrepreneurs and banks as instrumented by a
sequence of one-period loans. One might wonder whether focusing on short-term contracts
builds in the “imperfection” that drives our main results. The answer is yes and no. With
long-term contracts, or more generally contracts that diﬀe rf r o mt h es e q u e n c eo fo n e - p e r i o d
loans on which we focus, there might be room for improving over the credit allocation
outcomes obtained in our analysis. For example, for given capital buﬀers, setting higher
loan rates in the ﬁrst period and lower loan rates in the second would reduce the incidence
of credit rationing, since banks would have more capital to support their second period
lending. But in the context of our model, long-term contracts pose important commitment
and enforcement problems. In particular, they would have to specify the loan rates in the
ﬁrst and the second period, as well as the rationing scheme to be used in those cases where
the bank ends up with insuﬃcient lending capacity (since otherwise the bank might try to
renegotiate the terms of the second period loans by threatening entrepreneurs to put them
in the pool of rationed borrowers). This means that default rates in the ﬁrst period would
have to be veriﬁable, and banks would have to be restricted in their ability to pay dividends.
T h e ym i g h ta l s oh a v et oc o m m i tt om a i n t a i nac a p i t a lb u ﬀer in the ﬁrst period. The reason
for this is that when competing for borrowers in the ﬁrst period, banks internalize the whole
surplus that the underlying investment projects generate over the two periods, but once the
relationship starts, banks only internalize the return of their current and future lending. If
the second period loan rate is lower than a, then banks do not take into account part of
the continuation surplus when deciding how much capital to hold–recall that ﬁrst period
capital buﬀers are held for the purpose of reducing the expected credit rationing in the second
period. All in all, the previous considerations suggest that there are serious commitment
and enforcement problems that limit the possible improvements in the allocation of credit
that long-term contracts might bring about.
327.3 Imperfect access to the equity market
The assumption that banks with ongoing relationships have no access to the equity market
is obviously crucial for our results. With perfect, frictionless access to the equity market
in the interim period, there would be no credit rationing among second period borrowers,
except in the rare event that their bank fails (and it is not recapitalized by its shareholders).
Banks in such a context would most likely hold no buﬀers, at least under the high capital
requirements of Basel I or Basel II. Given the ample evidence of equity-issuance frictions,
the key question is whether the speciﬁcities of our approach–that ties these frictions to the
informational asymmetries associated with relationship lending–drive the results.
A more general way of capturing equity-issuance frictions would be to assume that access
can occur with some (exogenous) probability υ<1. Changes in parameter υ c o u l dt h e nb e
used to evaluate the “marginal” eﬀects of the friction on capital buﬀers and credit rationing.
One could also explore situations in which υ is contingent on the state s0 of the economy at
the interim date. This extension would probably conﬁrm the results obtained in the current
setup and might even reinforce our conclusions about the procyclicality of Basel II.36
It should also be noted that the really strong assumption that we are making is that banks
can frictionless access the equity market when they renew their stock of lending relationships.
This assumption is instrumental to achieving a tractable OLG structure in the context of
an inﬁnite horizon problem that otherwise would be characterized by longer memory and
more complex dynamics (namely, credit rationing might also aﬀect ﬁrst period loans and
the pricing of these loans might depend on the full history of the economy). A modeling
alternative would be to assume a structure similar to the one in the popular Calvo (1983)
model of staggered price setting, i.e., that in each period a fraction of the banks can issue
new equity. In this context one would have to discuss the allocation of the newly born
entrepreneurs to the existing banks. Would they demand loans to the recapitalizing banks
only? If not, how would the pricing of the new loans be determined?
36If banks can with some probability access the equity market in the interim period, they would have lower
incentives to keep capital buﬀers, so depending of parameter values, the incidence of credit rationing might
be higher.
337.4 Other extensions
The framework used in this paper could also be extended in a number of other directions.
First, we could consider lending relationships that extend over more than two periods. If
relationships last for T periods and banks cannot raise equity for the whole length of the
relationship, the qualitative results should be very similar to ours. Such a model would, of
course, yield richer dynamics, as the eﬀect of a shock would propagate over several periods.
Second, we could consider alternative distributions Fs(xt) of the default rate xt, keeping
the Basel II capital requirements as in (14), but allowing for thicker tails in the loan loss
distribution. Third, we could incorporate cyclically-varying demand. One easy way of doing
this would be to let the scale μ of second period projects vary with the state s of the econ-
omy. A bigger challenge would be to introduce some “downward sloping” aggregate demand
for loans, which could be done by assuming that entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their
opportunity cost of becoming active in the ﬁrst period. The already existing variability in
projects’ success probabilities would tend to produce (procyclical) variability in the demand
for loans. Further variability might be introduced by replacing the current success return a
for some as. Finally, one could allow for feedback eﬀects from constrained to unconstrained
entrepreneurs by letting at = a(It) instead of a,w h e r ea(It) is an increasing (and possibly
concave) function of It, the aggregate investment at date t. This will capture demand ex-
ternalities or technological complementarities similar to those studied in endogenous growth
theory. Analyzing these alternative models is beyond the scope of this paper.
8 Concluding Remarks
In many supervisory and industry reports on the implications of Basel II, it is standard to
ﬁrst recognize the potential cyclical eﬀects of the new risk-sensitive capital requirements and
then qualify that, given than most banks hold capital in excess of the regulatory minima, the
practical incidence of the procyclicality problem is likely to be small if not negligible. While
some of these reports do not have the extension or the technical nature required to elaborate
on the foundations of their claim, others unveil two related misconceptions at the heart of it.
34The ﬁrst misconception is that the holding of capital buﬀers means that capital requirements
are “not binding.” Under a purely static perspective this would be tautologically true. In
a convex optimization problem, it would also be true that small changes in the level of the
requirements would not alter the optimal capital holdings. In a dynamic problem, however,
this need not be the case: banks may hold capital buﬀers in a given period because they
wish to reduce the risk of facing a statically “binding” requirement in the future. Perhaps
these precautions make future requirements “not binding” when the time comes, but clearly
their presence alters banks’ capital decisions and the whole development of future events.
So observing that banks hold capital buﬀers does not mean that capital requirements do not
matter.
A second, related misconception is to accept that the cyclical behavior of capital buﬀers
under Basel II can be somehow predicted from the empirical behavior of capital buﬀers in
the Basel I era. If buﬀers are endogenously aﬀected by the prevailing bank capital regulation
(even if they appear not to “bind”), reduced-form extrapolations from the Basel I world to
the Basel II world do not resist the Lucas’ critique.
Our model provides a tractable framework in which it is possible to evaluate the cycli-
cal eﬀects of Basel II without incurring in these misconceptions. To keep the analysis as
transparent as possible, we have simpliﬁed on a number of dimensions. For example, we
abstract from demand side ﬂuctuations and aggregate feedback eﬀects that might mitigate
and exacerbate, respectively, the supply-side eﬀects that we identify. As we have discussed
above, one could take our model as a building block for a fuller dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model with a production sector partly composed of entrepreneurial ﬁrms that
rely on relationship bank lending. One could also think about extensions that generalize our
modeling of the frictions related to banks’ access to equity ﬁnancing. Our contribution, from
this perspective, is to show that the interaction of relationship lending (which makes some
borrowers dependent on the lending capacity of the speciﬁc bank with which they establish
a relationship) with frictions in banks’ access to equity markets (which makes some banks’
lending capacity a function of their historically determined capital positions and the capital
requirements imposed by regulation) has the potential to cause signiﬁcant cyclical swings in
35the supply of credit.
Under realistic parameterizations, the model produces capital buﬀers and equilibrium
loan rates whose levels and cyclicality in the Basel I regulatory environment are in line
with those observed in the data. The same parameterizations when applied to the Basel II
environment suggest that the new requirements imply a substantial increase in the procycli-
cality induced by bank capital regulation. Speciﬁcally, despite banks taking precautions and
holding larger buﬀers during expansions in order to have a reserve of capital for the next
recession (when capital requirements rise), the arrival of recessions is normally associated
with a sizeable credit crunch, as capital-constrained banks are induced to ration credit to
some of their dependent borrowers.
Having a model that explicitly accounts for the endogenous determination of capital
buﬀers and equilibrium loan rates is also important for policy analysis. We have shown
that some cyclical adjustments in the conﬁdence level of Basel II can substantially reduce
the incidence of credit rationing over the business cycle without compromising the long-run
solvency targets implied by the new regulation.
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A Proofs of analytical results
Solutions to the representative bank’s capital decision Using the deﬁnition of vss0(xt)
in (8), the net present value vs(ks,r s) of the representative bank that in state s holds capital
ks and charges an interest rate rs on its unit of initial loans may be written as
vs(ks,r s)=qsvsh(ks,r s)+( 1− qs)vsl(ks,r s), (15)
where
vss0(ks,r s)=β
"Z h xss0
0
[(βπs0 − γs0)μ + k
0
s(x)]dFs(x)+
βπs0
γs0
Z e xs
h xss0
k
0
s(x)dFs(x)
#
− ks. (16)
By the deﬁnitions (4) and (3) of e xss0 and b xs, the function vss0(ks,r s) has the following
properties:
1. For ks ≤ c − rs we have e xss0 < b xs ≤ 0, so
∂vss0
∂ks
= −1 < 0.
2. For c − rs <k s ≤ c − rs + γs0μ we have e xss0 ≤ 0 < b xs,s o
∂vss0
∂ks
=
β
2πs0
γs0
Fs(b xs) − 1 ≶ 0, and
∂2vss0
∂k2
s
=
β
2πs0F0
s(b xs)
γs0(λ + rs)
> 0.
3. For c − rs + γs0μ<k s <c+ λ + γs0μ we have 0 < e xss0 < 1,s o
∂vss0
∂ks
=
β
γs0
[βπs0Fs(b xs) − (βπs0 − γs0)Fs(e xss0)] − 1 ≶ 0,
and
∂2vss0
∂k2
s
=
β
γs0(λ + rs)
[βπs0F
0
s(b xs) − (βπs0 − γs0)F
0
s(e xss0)] ≶ 0.
4. For c + λ + γs0μ ≤ ks we have 1 ≤ e xss0 < b xs, so
∂vss0
∂ks
= β − 1 < 0.
37Hence the function vss0(ks,r s) is linearly decreasing or strictly convex for ks ≤ c−rs +γs0μ,
linearly decreasing for ks ≥ c + λ + γs0μ, and may be increasing or decreasing, and concave
or convex for c − rs + γs0μ<k s <c+ λ + γs0μ. Introducing the constraint ks ∈ [γs,1] (and
assuming that parameter values are such that c + λ + γs0μ<1) it follows that the problem
maxks∈[γs,1] vss0(ks,r s) has either a corner solution with ks = γs, or an interior solution with
ks ∈ (c − rs + γs0μ,c + λ + γs0μ). In the latter case we have 0 < e xss0 < 1,s ot h e r ei sa
positive probability Fs(e xss0) that the bank has excess lending capacity in state s0, and a
positive probability 1 − Fs(e xss0) that the bank has insuﬃcient lending capacity in state s0.
Since γl ≤ γh implies c−rs +γlμ ≤ c−rs +γhμ and c+λ+γlμ ≤ c+λ+γhμ, we conclude
that the problem maxks∈[γs,1] [qsvsh(ks,r s)+( 1− qs)vsl(ks,r s)] has either a corner solution
with ks = γs, or an interior solution with ks ∈ (c−rs +γlμ,c +λ+γhμ). In the latter case,
there must be a positive probability that the bank has insuﬃcient lending capacity in state
s0 = h (and possibly also in state s0 = l), and a positive probability that the bank has excess
lending capacity in state s0 = l (and possibly also in state s0 = h).
Comparative statics of the initial loan rate The sign of dr∗
s/dz for z = a,λ,μ,c,δ,qs,γh,γl
can be obtained by total diﬀerentiation of (10):
∂vs
∂ks
dk∗
s
dz
+
∂vs
∂rs
dr∗
s
dz
+
∂vs
∂z
=0 . (17)
When k∗
s is interior, the ﬁrst-order condition for a maximum that follows from (11) gives
∂vs/∂ks |(k∗
s,r∗
s)=0 , so the ﬁrst term in (17) vanishes. Moreover when k∗
s is interior it must
b et h ec a s et h a t0 < e xss0 < 1 for at least one state s0, so diﬀerentiating (15) and (16) we
have
∂vs
∂rs
= qs
∂vsh
∂rs
+( 1− qs)
∂vsl
∂rs
> 0,
since
∂vss0
∂rs
= β
"Z h xss0
0
(1 − x) dFs(x)+
βπs0
γs0
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h xss0
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#
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with strict inequality for at least one state s0. H e n c ew ea r el e f tw i t h :
dr∗
s
dz
= −
µ
∂vs
∂rs
¶−1 ∂vs
∂z
. (18)
38Similarly, in a corner solution with k∗
s = γs we have dk∗
s/dz =0for all z 6= γs,i nw h i c h
case the ﬁrst term in (17) also vanishes and (18) obtains again. Finally, for z = γs,w eh a v e
dk∗
s/dγs =1and, thus,
dr∗
s
dγs
= −
µ
∂vs
∂rs
¶−1 µ
∂vs
∂γs
+
∂vs
∂ks
¶
,
where ∂vs/∂ks |(k∗
s,r∗
s)≤ 0, since otherwise ﬁxing k∗
s = γs would not be optimal. With
these expressions in mind, the results in Table 1 can be immediately related to the (self-
explanatory) signs of the partial derivatives of vs(k∗
s,r ∗
s) that we summarize in Table A1 (and
whose detailed expressions we omit, for brevity).
Table A1. Eﬀects on the net present value of the bank
z = rs aλμcδq s γh γl
∂vs
∂z
++− + −− − − −
Comparative statics of the initial capital When the optimal initial capital in state s
is at the corner k∗
s = γs, with ∂vs/∂ks |(k∗
s,r∗
s)< 0, marginal changes in any parameter other
than γs will have no impact on k∗
s, while obviously dk∗
s/dγs =1 . Thus, in what follows we
focus on the more interesting interior solution case.37
The sign of dk∗
s/dz for z = a,λ,μ,c,δ,qs,γh,γl can be obtained by total diﬀerentiation
of the ﬁrst-order condition ∂vs/∂ks =0that characterizes an interior equilibrium:
∂2vs
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dz
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=0 . (19)
By the second-order condition we have ∂2vs/∂k2
s < 0, which gives
dk∗
s
dz
= −
µ
∂2vs
∂k2
s
¶−1 µ
∂2vs
∂ks∂z
+
∂2vs
∂ks∂rs
dr∗
s
dz
¶
.
37T h ec a s ew i t hk∗
s = γs and ∂vs/∂ks |(k∗
s,r∗
s)=0is a mixture of both cases since, depending on the sign of
the eﬀect of the marginal variation in a parameter, the optimal decision might shift from being at the corner
to being interior. A similar complexity may occur if the change in a parameter breaks some underlying
indiﬀerence between an interior and a corner solution (or between two interior solutions). We will omit the
discussion of these cases, for simplicity.
39Hence the sign of dk∗
s/dz coincides with the sign of the second term in brackets, which has
two components: the direct eﬀect of z on k∗
s (for constant r∗
s)a n dt h el o a nr a t ee ﬀect (due
to the eﬀect of z on r∗
s). The signs of the direct eﬀects shown in the ﬁr s tr o wo fT a b l e2
coincide with the signs of the cross derivatives ∂2vs/∂ks∂z summarized in Table A2 (whose
detailed expressions we omit, for brevity).
Table A2. Eﬀects on the marginal value of capital
z = rs aλμcδq s γh γl
∂2vs
∂ks∂z
− +? + −− ???
T h es i g n so ft h el o a nr a t ee ﬀects shown in the second row of Table 2 can be simply obtained
from the results summarized on Table 1 and the fact that by diﬀerentiating (15) and (16)
one can show that
∂2vs
∂ks∂rs
= qs
∂2vsh
∂ks∂rs
+( 1− qs)
∂2vsl
∂ks∂rs
< 0,
where
∂2vss0
∂ks∂rs
=
β
γs0(λ + rs)
[βπs0(1 − b xs)F
0
s(b xs) − (βπs0 − γs0)(1 − e xss0)F
0
s(e xss0)].
To check this notice that the second-order condition ∂2vs/∂k2
s < 0 implies
βfs(b xs)
∙
qs
πh
γh
+( 1− qs)
πl
γl
¸
<q s
βπh − γh
γh
F
0
s(e xsh)+( 1− qs)
βπl − γl
γl
F
0
s(e xsl).
Hence using the deﬁnitions (3) and (4) of b xs and e xss0, together with the fact that γl ≤ γh,
we have 1 − b xs < 1 − e xsl ≤ 1 − e xsh, so we conclude that
β(1−b xs)fs(b xs)
∙
qs
πh
γh
+( 1− qs)
πl
γl
¸
<q s
βπh − γh
γh
(1−e xsh)F
0
s(e xsh)+(1−qs)
βπl − γl
γl
(1−e xsl)F
0
s(e xsl),
which after some reordering proves the result.
40B Discussion of parameter values
Interest rate on continuation loans: a =0 .04. T h ei n t e r e s tr a t e so nb a n k s ’m a r g i n a l
lending and borrowing activities are not available in standard statistical sources. A com-
mon approach is to proxy them with implicit average rates computed from accounting ﬁg-
ures. According to the FDIC Statistics on Banking for the years 2004 to 2007 (available at
http://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/SOB/), Total interest income of all US commercial banks repre-
s e n t s ,o na v e r a g e ,5 . 7 4 %o fEarning assets, while Total interest expense represents 2.32% of
Total liabilities. This yields an average net interest margin of 3.42%. Yet Service charges
on deposit accounts are 0.55% of Total deposits, which implies that deposit-funded activities
yield an average intermediation margin of 3.97%. This number is very close to our assumed
4%. (See Figure 1 for quarterly data on the net interest margin of US banks over a longer
period.)
Cost of setting up a lending relationship: c =0 .03. This is a rather conservative
estimate of the importance of intermediation costs. According to the FDIC Statistics on
Banking for the years 2004 to 2007, Total non-interest expense of all US commercial banks
41represented an average of 3.97% of Total assets.
Cost of bank capital: δ =0 .04. Based on the estimates of Graham (2000) for non-ﬁnancial
corporations, an annual discount rate of 4% is a rather conservative estimate for the tax
disadvantage of equity ﬁnancing. To see this, consider the standard measure of the marginal
tax shield of debt ﬁnancing, net of personal taxes: MTS =[ ( 1 −τi)−(1−τc)(1−τe)]/(1−τi),
where τi,τc, and τe are the marginal tax rates on personal interest income, corporate income,
and personal equity income, respectively. As in Hennessy and Whited (2007), set τi =0 .29
and consider τc =0 .40 as an upper bound to τc (based on the combination of the top
statutory federal rate and the average state rate as reported by Graham, 2000). Suppose,
conservatively, that τe =0 , so that the marginal investor manages to make its equity income
fully exempt from personal taxation. Then we get MTS ' 0.04 for τc =0 .32, where this last
choice is consistent with US data. In particular, for US commercial banks over the period
2004-2007, Applicable income taxes represented, on average, 31.7% of Pre-tax net operating
income. As in Hennessy and Whited (2007), this number can be seen as the expected tax
rate in a situation in which the representative bank earns positive taxable income and hence
faces an eﬀective corporate tax rate of τc with a probability of 80%, while it faces an eﬀective
zero tax rate with a probability of 20%.
Probabilities of transition to the high default state: ql =0 .20 and qh =0 .64. In our
Markov switching setup, the expected durations of states l and h are 1/ql and 1/(1 − qh),
respectively. We calibrate these durations using data from the FDIC Historical Statistics on
Banking (available at http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/index.asp). Speciﬁcally, we compute the
annual ratio of Net loan and lease charge-oﬀs to Gross loans and leases for FDIC-insured
commercial banks over the period 1969-2004, and we detrend the series using the standard
HP-ﬁlter for annual data. The resulting series includes 20 below-average observations in
4 complete low default phases (implying an average duration of 20/4 = 5 years) and 14
above-average observations in 5 complete high default phases (implying an average duration
of 14/5 ' 2.8 years). The observations corresponding to 1969 and 2004 belong to censored
below-average phases that are not taken into account. The imputed expected durations are
42in line with Koopman et al. (2005), that identify a stochastic cycle in US business failure
rates with a period of between 8 and 11 years.
PD scenarios: pl ∈ [1.00,1.30] and ph ∈ [2.88,3.63]. In the Special Report “Commercial
Banks in 1999” (available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/ﬁles/bb/bbspecial.pdf), the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia oﬀers data on the experience of US commercial banks
during the full cycle of the 1990s. Following the 1990-1991 recession, the aggregate ratio of
Non-performing loans to Total loans was slightly above 3% in years 1990-1993, declined to
slightly above 2% in 1993, and remained below 1.5% (with a downward trend) for the rest
of the decade. It is also possible to check the realism of our PD scenarios by looking at the
ratio of Loan losses to Total loans, whose quarterly evolution over recent years appears in
Figure 2. Notice that under our assumption about the value of the LGD parameter, λ =0 .45
(which we take from the “foundation IRB” approach of Basel II), the average default rate
behind the series in Figure 2 should be 1/0.45 ' 2.22 times the ratio depicted there, which
a g a i ns u g g e s t st h er e a l i s mo fo u rc h o i c eo fP D ss l i g h t l ya b o v e1 %i nl o wd e f a u l ts t a t e sa n d
around 3% in high default states.
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